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	I provide in this paper an examination of the influence of Immanuel Kant on the internal realist Hilary Putnam.  I begin by discussing Putnam’s transition from external, or metaphysical, realism to internal realism, and argue in favor of the view that Kant is best understood as an internal realist.  Where Putnam is concerned, I am interested here only in his versions of external and internal realism and not with his more recent views.  Having laid out a case for internal realism, I go on to discuss and defend Putnam’s interpretation of Kant’s views on the nature of truth, arguing that although Kant accepts correspondence as a nominal definition of truth, he should not be understood as endorsing the metaphysical realist conception of truth.  I conclude by arguing against those, including Ian Hacking and Allen Wood, who believe that the internal realist Putnam misinterpreted Kant on the nature of truth.  This criticism rests on a misunderstanding of what Kant must have meant by ‘correspondence.’  Kant does not offer a theory of truth, but had he done so, his theory would be compatible with the internal realist Putnam’s.  The view that their views on the nature of truth are incompatible is founded largely on misunderstanding of Kant, Putnam or both.

I.  Introduction
	Immanuel Kant had a profound influence on Hilary Putnam’s transition from external (or metaphysical) realism to internal realism.  There are good reasons to think of Kant as offering a version of internal realism.  As I shall argue in Section II, there are important and compelling reasons to prefer some version of internal realism to external realism.  In Section III, I provide a general discussion of Kant’s influence on Putnam.  In Section IV, I discuss the alleged incompatibility of the two philosophers’ views on the nature of truth.​[1]​  I shall argue that their views on this topic are compatible and that the opinion of some philosophers that they are incompatible is founded largely on misunderstanding of Kant, Putnam or both.

II.  External Versus Internal Realism
	It should be admitted at the outset that something like external realism is the default position.  Before I was exposed to Kant and to debates surrounding realism in twentieth-century philosophy of science, it would not have occurred to me to embrace internalism.  I acknowledge that internal realists tell us some things that common sense will find difficult to swallow.  I harbor no illusions that what I write here will settle the fractious debate between external and internal realists.  I enter upon this discussion in a spirit of modesty, aware that the internal realist carries a substantial burden of proof.
	External and internal realists have different ideals.  They differ, for example, in what they mean when write and speak of ‘the world’, ‘reality’ and ‘truth’.  We like to believe that we have access to the world as it exists apart from the structures of our minds, our languages and our conceptual schemes.  Indeed, the external realist does believe this.
The external realist (or at least the external realist Putnam) accepts three theses:  (1) The world consists of a fixed totality of mind-independent objects;  (2) There is one, and only one, true and complete description of the world; (3) Truth is a matter of correspondence.  I will not discuss the second thesis in this paper; the first and third are much more important to the external realist position.  The external realist does not believe, at any rate, that we will ever arrive at one “true and complete description of the world” and the internal realist regards it as crazy even to speak in such terms.
The internal realist will reply to (1) that it does not make sense to ask what the world is except from within a conceptual framework.  To believe that we can have knowledge of mind-independent reality is a mistake.  Internal realism tells us that there is no God’s Eye point of view available to us; to think that there is the great philosophical fantasy of the external realist.  We cannot escape ourselves.  Putnam makes a point that will ring bells for those who are familiar with Kant’s first Critique:  ‘Our conceptions of coherence and acceptability are…deeply interwoven with our psychology’ and are dependent upon ‘our biology and culture.’​[2]​  Here the externalist might charge the internalist with endorsing a lazy relativism, but the internalist will deny that he is giving up on standards or on objectivity.​[3]​  The internalist does believe in objectivity, i.e., in ‘objectivity for us.’  Our conceptions ‘are conceptions of something real,’​[4]​ even though we do not have access to mind-independent reality.  Putnam offers the following standards in response to the charge of relativism:
(1)	In ordinary circumstances, there is usually a fact of the matter as to whether the 
statements people make are warranted or not.
(2)	Whether a statement is warranted or not is independent of whether the majority
of one’s cultural peers would say it is warranted or unwarranted.
(3)	Our norms and standards of warranted assertibility evolve in time.
(4)	Our norms and standards always reflect our interests and values.  Our picture of
intellectual flourishing is part of, and only makes sense as part of, our picture of
human flourishing in general.
(5)	Our norms and standards of anything—including warranted assertibility—are
capable of reform.​[5]​
So Putnam is not, as he puts it, presenting us with “a facile relativism that says, ‘Anything goes.’”​[6]​  As James Conant writes, Putnam ‘aims to set forth a conception of objectivity that is more faithful to our actual (both everyday and scientific) practices of adjudicating conflicting knowledge-claims and achieving forms of rational consensus.’​[7]​  As Ernest Sosa once wrote, ‘Exceptional among contemporary philosophers, Hilary Putnam has long defended a philosophy sane enough to hold not only water, but also people and even values.’​[8]​  The same claim can be made on Kant’s behalf.  Like Putnam, he does not think we have access to things as they are in themselves.  We have, to use Kant’s terminology, access to phenomena but not to noumena.​[9]​. Noumena correspond to what Putnam refers to as mind-independent reality.  Kant writes, ‘[I] know nothing of what it is in itself, and have no concept of it except merely that of a sensible intuition in general, which is therefore the same for all appearances.’​[10]​  Like Putnam, Kant rejects the externalist’s account of the sort of knowledge it is possible for us to have of objects.  Let me write a few words now about Putnam’s views on the topic of truth.
The contemporary internal realist’s reply to externalist thesis (3) is that truth is not a matter of correspondence.  Prima facie Kant seems to be at odds with (3), but I shall save my discussion of this for later.​[11]​  Of the three theses, it seems to be the third that gets to the heart of external realism and it is, from what I know of the literature, embraced by all external realists.  But truth is not a matter of correspondence for the internal realist.  At least in cannot be a matter of correspondence between our assertions and mind-independent reality.  The internal realist argues that truth is an epistemic matter and understands it as a matter of ‘(idealized) rational acceptability.’  But truth cannot just be a matter of warranted assertibility.  Recall that according to Putnam’s fifth principle, ‘Our norms and standards of anything—including warranted assertibility—are capable of reform.’  More to the point, they are capable of improvement.  If that were all it were, the charge of relativism sometimes leveled against Putnam and other internal realists would stick.  It is important that truth be conceived of as idealized warranted assertibility.
	Putnam writes:
	To reject the idea that there is a coherent ‘external’ perspective, a theory which is simply 
true ‘in itself’, apart from all possible observers, is not to identify truth with rational 
acceptability.  Truth cannot simply be rational acceptability for one fundamental reason; 
truth is supposed to be a property of a statement that cannot be lost, whereas justification 
can be lost.​[12]​

Statements, which are merely rationally acceptable, are often understood to be true, but this does not mean that they are true, for they do not meet the standard of idealized rational acceptability that would allow us say with sufficient warrant that they are true.  To think that rational acceptability by itself is enough to give us truth would be to rest content with standards that are far too lax.  “The statement ‘The earth is flat’ was,” Putnam writes, “very likely, rationally acceptable 3,000 years ago; but it is not rationally acceptable today.”  Those who believed centuries ago that the earth is flat no doubt thought that the statement ‘The earth is flat’ is true, but it cannot have been true that the earth was flat according to Putnam’s standards of truth, ‘for that would mean that the earth has changed its shape.’​[13]​  If external realists think that Putnam’s theory allows for this, that he gives us an account of truth that merely tells us what we can get away with, they are wildly mistaken.  The situation is the same for the statement ‘The sun orbits the earth’.  Both of these statements were rationally acceptable in the past; they fit the theories of those who uttered them and they fit their experiences.  But they were not true.  Truth is not dependent upon justification at any particular time and place, but this is not to say that it is ‘independent of all justification.’​[14]​  Putnam goes on to claim, “In addition, rational acceptability is a matter of degree; truth is sometimes referred to as a matter of degree…but the degree here is the accuracy of the statement, and not its degree of acceptability or justification.”​[15]​  What does this discussion show?
	The externalist may think that it shows his conception of truth to be correct.  Of course, Putnam would not agree and would insist that the externalist has misread him if he thinks otherwise.  What has been shown according to Putnam is that ‘truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.’​[16]​  This is not to say that we can ever reach ideal standards of rational acceptability.  Truth remains somewhat elusive.  After all, we lack access to a God’s Eye point of view.  But at least we are not stuck in a morass of untrammeled relativism.  It might still seem that Putnam’s account of truth is too vague.  But the internal realist tells us that we will just have to live with this except, perhaps, in trivial cases such as ‘Snow is white’ and ‘All bachelors are unmarried.’  Putnam writes:  ‘I am not trying to give a formal definition of truth [something external realists have pressed for], but an informal elucidation of the notion.’​[17]​  Putnam is trying to elucidate how we should understand truth given that there is no ‘fixed totality of mind-independent objects’ accessible to us, how we should understand truth given how we use the term, and how we should understand truth given that we cannot escape and that we cannot bracket the deep structures of our minds, our languages and our theories to access what Kant would call noumena.
	Having laid out a case for internal realism, I turn now to a general discussion of Kant’s influence on Putnam and, then, to a discussion of Kant’s account of truth and Putnam’s controversial interpretation thereof.

III.  Putnam’s Kantianism:  A General Discussion
Neither Kant nor Putnam denies that there is an external world (what Kant refers to as the noumenal world).  They agree that the powers of sensibility and understanding (including our faculties and intuitions, to use Kantian terminology, and our theories and languages, to use Putnam’s terminology) are crucial to our understanding of the world.  As Putnam puts it, ‘The mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world.’​[18]​  That is, our understanding of the world is not independent of the noumenal world, nor is the world as we understand it—our world, the world of our experience—independent of how we are fitted to understand it.
	Kant’s influence on Putnam is on prominent display in Reason, Truth and History, especially in the chapter titled ‘Two Philosophical Perspectives’, and in Realism with a Human Face, especially in the chapters titled ‘A Defense of Internal Realism’ and ‘Realism with a Human Face.’  Indeed, Putnam dedicates ‘Realism with a Human Face’ to Kant.  At the beginning of the eponymous essay contained in Realism with a Human Face, Putnam writes:  “[M]y indebtedness to Kant is very large, even if it must be ‘this side of idolatry.’  For me, at least, almost all the problems of philosophy attain the form in which they are of real interest only with the work of Kant.”​[19]​  This points to a profound change in Putnam’s philosophical outlook.  Before Reason, Truth and History Putnam seldom mentions, let alone venerates, Kant.  As an external realist, Putnam seems to have been the sort of analytic philosopher who was at pains to distance himself from Kant.  At any rate, as James Conant writes, Kant appears in Putnam’s early work as ‘a deplorably influential dead German philosopher who held misguided views about the synthetic a priori nature of geometry and arithmetic.’​[20]​  Such an assessment of Kant is both unkind and unfair.  Fortunately, Putnam came to see that we analytic philosophers still have a lot to learn from Kant.  This is not to say that the internal realist Putnam is just offering Kant all over again.
	Putnam did not become a thoroughgoing Kantian, but he did come to a new understanding and appreciation of Kant’s role in the history of Western Philosophy.  Changes in philosophical orientation, such as that from external to internal realism, on Putnam’s part should come as no surprise to anyone with even glancing familiarity with Putnam’s career.  I recall having read somewhere that some of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century have been named ‘Hilary Putnam.’  Humor aside, what is Kant’s value for Putnam?  Putnam’s controversial reading of Kant’s views on truth certainly is important.  More generally, however, Conant writes:
	As Putnam’s own philosophical views develop, his philosophical agenda increasingly 
comes to resemble the one he finds in Kant.  The result is both an increasing interest in 
Kant and a deepening of appreciation of the extent to which he succeeded in grasping and defining the problems that continue to plague contemporary philosophy.  Kant’s achievement, 
on this view, lies not primarily in the answers [though they deserve great respect given their
	influence on current philosophical discussion] he provided but rather in the manner in which 
he pressed the questions.​[21]​

‘Of course,’ Putnam writes, ‘philosophical problems are unsolvable.’​[22]​  Perhaps that is a bit overblown, for surely some philosophical problems can be and have been solved, though perhaps not the ones that seem most pressing to us.  Still, Putnam has a good point.  Philosophy is as much about asking questions as it is about finding answers.  Kant’s way of asking questions, whatever one thinks of his answers, is an important source of inspiration for many philosophers today.  ‘[T]here are,’ as Stanley Cavell once said, ‘better and worse ways of thinking’ about philosophical questions.​[23]​  Putnam clearly sees Kant as providing a model of how to ask philosophical questions.  In his explication of Putnam’s Kantianism, Conant points out that, ‘Kant’s achievement…lies not primarily on the answers he provided but rather in the manner in which he pressed the questions.’​[24]​  Perhaps, but Kant’s answers are a substantial achievement.  Putnam’s internal realism, whatever its other positive results, may rightly be seen as a recapturing of the Kantian spirit.  We may be grateful for that, whether or not we agree with all or any elements of Putnam’s Kant interpretation. So, what is the relationship between Kant’s and Putnam’s views?  How can—how should—Kant be regarded as an internal realist?
	For one thing, Kant would agree with the assertion ventured by Putnam, ‘The mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world.’  This metaphor does an excellent job of getting at the heart of the internal realist position.​[25]​  Putnam writes:
	In short, I shall advance a view in which the mind does not simply [in line with his 
opposition to the metaphysical realist theses previously mentioned] “copy” a world 
which admits of description by One True Theory.  But my view is not a view in 
which the mind makes up the world, either (or makes it up subject to constraints 
imposed by “methodological canons” and mind-independent “sense-data”).  If one 
must use metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this:  the mind and the world 
jointly make up the mind and the world.  (Or, to make the metaphor even more Hegelian, 
the Universe makes up the Universe—with minds—collectively—playing a special role 
in making it up.​[26]​

And they both reject robust idealism of the sort advanced by such philosophers as Bishop Berkeley.  So, in addition to rejecting external realism, Kant and Putnam also reject extreme idealism.​[27]​  Mind-independent reality is not accessible to us, but neither is our world just a fabrication of our minds.  Idealism may be relatively easy to refute, but the default position—external realism—exerts a stronger pull on most philosophers.
External realism has an intrinsic attractiveness and it leads us to what Kant termed ‘transcendental illusion.’  Such illusion leads us to think that we are able to attain a sort of knowledge—noumenal knowledge—that will always be beyond our grasp.  This is not because there is not a mind-independent world but because how we understand the mind-independent world is always mediated by the deep structures of our minds, theories and languages.  In the Analytic, Kant argues that the positions of possible experience coincide with conditions of possible human knowledge.  This implies that transcendent metaphysics should not claim to provide knowledge.  Transcendental metaphysics, to which both Kant and Putnam object, incorrectly tells us that propositions of transcendental metaphysics are meaningless.  We have a natural tendency to ask transcendental-metaphysical questions, but we cannot know the answers to questions that transcend the limits of our understanding.  If reason is to be content with itself, we need to explain why we ask transcendental-metaphysical questions.  Kant wants the Dialectic to give an account of the limits of human knowledge.  We employ concepts of transcendental metaphysics to see the limits of human knowledge.  Kant tells us​[28]​ that we have to be able to understand the objects of our knowledge as experiences so we do not make the dogmatist assertion that our mode of cognition is the only possible mode of cognition, which would be to take principles of the possibility of experience for universal conditions as applying to things as they are in themselves.  But we have already seen from the argument in the previous section that we cannot have knowledge of things as they are in themselves.  The external realists’ error is in thinking that we can access things as they are in themselves.  Externalists provide us with prime examples of transcendental illusion, which arises when principles the legitimacy of which lie in directing the understanding in its investigations are employed to get at transcendental judgments, i.e., judgments concerning things in themselves.  Kant’s view is that we are necessarily subject to transcendental illusion.  But it is just such illusion that Kant and Putnam object to in arguing against transcendental metaphysics.  So long as philosophers insist on clinging to external realism, they allow themselves to remain in thrall to a chimerical conception of what philosophy is capable of.
	Like Kant, Putnam does not advocate the view that we can arrive at a conception of reality independent of our concepts and our inescapably human perspective.​[29]​  If such a perspective were available to us, we would be gods and not men.  Putnam takes from Kant the view that our understanding of the world is not—and cannot be—standpoint-independent.  Allow me now to turn again to the important topic of truth.

IV.  Truth Revisited
	Putnam’s interpretation of Kant’s views on the topic of truth has generated a fair amount of controversy.  Indeed, Putnam’s interpretation of Kant on this point is idiosyncratic, but it is far from being as wrongheaded as some of Putnam’s detractors have concluded.  But in light of Putnam’s discussion of internal realism and the severely limited scope of Kant’s discussion of the topic, it seems that Putnam’s interpretation of Kant is at least plausible.  Kant and Putnam are closer on this interpretation than they at first seem to be.  Kant writes:
	The old and famous question with which the logicians were to be driven into a corner 
and brought to such a pass that must either fall into a miserable circle or else confess their ignorance, hence the vanity of their entire art is this:  What is truth?  The nominal definition 
of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is granted and 
presupposed.​[30]​

Kant goes on to write:  ‘The merely logical criterion of truth, namely the agreement of a cognition with the general and formal laws of understanding and reason, is therefore certainly the conditio sine qua non and thus the negative condition of all truth…’​[31]​ Of course, if we follow Kant, what we will wind up making are true claims about are phenomena, not noumena.  Insofar as truth is to be understood as a matter of correspondence, it will not be correspondence of the sort pressed by external realists.  What is more, it seems that Kantian correspondence, when we can get it, will wind up looking much like idealized warranted assertibility.
	Still, prima facie Kant’s account of truth appears to be incompatible with Putnam’s internal realist account of truth, however compatible many of their other views are.  I turn now to Putnam’s interpretation of what little Kant has to say on the subject of truth and then to discussion of some not unsurprising criticisms of Putnam on this score.
	Putnam writes:  ‘The theory that truth is correspondence is certainly the natural one.  Before Kant it is perhaps impossible to find any philosopher who did not have a correspondence theory of truth.’​[32]​  But is this not a blatant contradiction of the passages on truth in the Critique of Pure Reason quoted above.  Putnam thinks not and on this I am willing to cast my lot with Putnam.  He goes so far as to write the following:  “I want to say that, although Kant never quite says that this is what he is doing, Kant is best read as proposing for the first time what I have called the ‘internalist’ or ‘internal realist’ view of truth.”​[33]​  The assertion that Kant is a sort of internal realist should not lead to controversy.  A few pages later, Putnam writes:
	Kant does not, indeed say he is giving up the correspondence theory of truth.  On the 
contrary, he says that truth is the ‘correspondence of a judgment to its object’.  But 
this is what Kant called a ‘nominal definition of truth’.  On my view, identifying this 
with what the metaphysical realist means by ‘the correspondence theory of truth’ would 
be a grave error.​[34]​

In ‘The First Twenty Years of Critique,’ George di Giovanni informs the reader that Kant ‘shifted the axis of the relation in which truth consists from the supposed space separating the thing in itself and the mind to a space within the mind.’​[35]​  This bolsters the claim that Kant is best regarded as an internal realist and is enough to let us know, in line with Putnam’s Kant interpretation, that if for Kant truth is in some sense a matter of correspondence it will not be correspondence of the sort touted by externalists.  “The new assumption,’ di Giovanni goes on to write, “is that the thing in itself is indeed present to the mind in experience—not however as it is ‘in itself,’ but only in the form of ‘appearances’.”​[36]​  So, our true knowledge claims do not correspond to mind-independent reality.  Rather, our knowledge claims provide a model of that reality.  So, already the externalist account of truth is undermined on this view.  What we wind up with, instead, is the idea that the truth of our knowledge claims is a matter of correspondence to phenomenal reality and insofar as we can vouch for the truth of our knowledge claims it will be from the human point of view, that is, truth will be a matter idealized warranted assertibility.  Insofar as we have knowledge of the noumenal it will be, as it were, mediate knowledge.  To put it another way, Kant accepts ‘correspondence’ as a nominal definition of truth, but he is not accepting a definition of truth according to which our concepts ‘copy’ mind-independent reality.  
Consider the concept of a body.  No concept can relate immediately to an object, so in this case the concept of a body relates to the object mediately by referring to an immediate representation or intuition of the object.  Thus, knowledge requires intuitions and concepts.  To have knowledge, we must think about objects and this requires concepts.​[37]​  I am thinking here of Kant’s assertion, “All bodies are divisible.”  This involves two concepts, which are related to each other and to the object of judgment, which in this case is the set of all things thought under the description contained in the concept of a body.
	Let me turn now to a couple of critics.  Ian Hacking, an external realist and critic of Putnam, writes:  ‘The transcendental idealist is, therefore, an empirical realist.’​[38]​  There is no problem with this, so long as we bear in mind that Kant’s empirical realism is of the internal realist variety.  As Hacking writes, ‘It is essential to Kant’s point of view [and to Putnam’s] that what we call objects are constituted within a scheme, and that our knowledge can pertain only to objects thus constituted.  Our knowledge of phenomena and our objects lie in a phenomenal world.’​[39]​  This is what Putnam is getting at when he tells us, contra the first external realist thesis, that the objects of our knowledge do not exist independently of our conceptual schemes.  He is writing of phenomenal objects.  But he certainly is not saying that objects depend entirely upon us for their existence.  Trees, dinosaurs, etc., would still have existed even if we had never existed.  So far, Hacking’s interpretation of Kant and Putnam seems to be on the mark.  But Hacking seems to attribute a much stronger and rather crazy view to Putnam that is out of line with Putnam’s neo-Kantianism.  Hacking’s mistake, roughly, is in thinking that Putnam believes, ‘The mind makes up the world.’  Putnam has never believed this in any of his philosophical guises.  That is a mistake on par with thinking that Kant embraces robust idealism of the Cartesian and Berkeleyan variety, which clearly he does not.  But Hacking is not to be too quickly dismissed.  He writes:
	Like so many modern philosophers, Putnam builds much of his philosophy around the 
idea of truth.  Of Kant, he says “there is no correspondence theory of truth in his 
philosophy.” Not surprising:  There is no theory of truth in Kant’s philosophy!​[40]​

Hacking is correct that Kant does not provide the reader with a theory of truth, even if he does accept ‘correspondence’ as a nominal definition of truth.  As I hope my previous discussion indicates, however, Hacking is missing something important in accusing Putnam of getting Kant wrong on this score, for in halfheartedly endorsing correspondence as a definition of truth Kant says nothing at odds with internal realism so long as we are willing to modify the traditional view of what ‘correspondence’ amounts to.  I fail to see how, in light of much else in the first Critique, Kant’s acceptance of correspondence as a nominal definition of truth could ever amount to anything like what the external realist means when he talks about and defends the ‘correspondence theory of truth.’
	In his book on Kant, Allen Wood writes, “Some philosophers have thought that Kant’s revolutionary transcendental way of regarding experience involves a denial of the ‘correspondence’ theory of truth.”​[41]​  Kant’s views certainly do involve a denial of correspondence as it is traditionally understood, that is, as correspondence to mind-independent reality.  Wood is correct when he writes, “Taken literally, this is clearly mistaken, since Kant explicitly affirms, as a ‘nominal’ definition, that truth consists of a correspondence of a judgment to an object, and he denies that any ‘real’ definition of truth is possible [italics mine].”​[42]​  This seems to be quite in line with Putnam’s desire to explicate the meaning of the word “truth” as we normally use it.  Wood accuses Putnam misunderstanding Kant, but Putnam is well aware that Kant accepts correspondence as a nominal definition of truth.  It is the nominal that we should pay attention to.  Although Wood thinks that Putnam is wrong, it is a mistake to accuse Putnam of error in maintaining that Putnam is mistaken to extract from the Critique of Pure Reason a view according to which “a true statement is whatever a rational being would accept on sufficient evidence,”​[43]​ That is, on evidence that accords with the deep structures of our minds and our conceptual frameworks.  Neither Kant nor Putnam claim that we will ever arrive at idealized rational acceptability.  Furthermore, Kant gives us no reason whatsoever to think that our knowledge claims must correspond to things in themselves.  Insofar as Kant is to be understood as denying the correspondence theory of truth he is to be understood as denying it only insofar as it inflicts upon us the fantasy that our knowledge-claims hook up with mind-independent reality.​[44]​  Wood goes on to wonder if Putnam intends to suggest that Kant does not regard appearances as ‘realities,’ that only noumena are real.  If Putnam did mean this, he would be guilty of misunderstanding Kant, but there is nothing in Putnam’s internal realism to lead us to think that Putnam attributes such a view to Kant.  Indeed, both Kant and Putnam do regard appearances as ‘realities,’ even if their reality exists only, as it were, in the image.

V.  Conclusion
	Putnam and Kant are both internal realists.  Putnam’s switch from external to internal realism is clearly influenced by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, however controversial some of Putnam’s interpretations of Kant may be.  There can be no disputing that in the works cited here these two eminent philosophers reject the metaphysical realist thesis that we have or even can have access to mind-independent reality, to the noumenal realm, to the world apart from how our minds are fitted to understand it, our theories and our languages.  Putnam’s interpretation of Kant’s views on the topic of truth is more controversial.  But in spite of the fact that Kant accepts ‘correspondence’ as a nominal definition of truth, what he says elsewhere in the Critique of Pure Reason should lead us to conclude that he cannot mean by “correspondence” anything like what the external realist means by the term.  Those who accuse Putnam of misinterpreting Kant are, to put it bluntly, wrong.
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^28	 Ibid., A350-351. 
^29	  Expressing a sentiment that would be shared by Kant, Putnam writes:  ‘My own view is that the success of science cannot be anything but a puzzle as long as we view concepts and objects as radically independent; that is, as long as we think of ‘the world’ as an entity that has a fixed nature, determined once and for all, independently of our framework of concepts…If we do shift our way of thinking to the extent of regarding ‘the world’ as partly constituted by the representing mind, then many things in our popular philosophy [and much of common sense] must be reexamined’ [Putnam, Realism with a Human Face, 162].  See also my discussion above of the three external realist theses he once advanced.
^30	 Kant., A58. 
^31	 Ibid., A60. 
^32	 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, 56.
^33	 Ibid., 60. 
^34	 Ibid., 63. 
^35	 Di Giovanni, George.  “The First Twenty Years of Critique.”  Paul Guyer, ed.  The Cambridge Companion to Kant.  Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 1992, 418.  See also Kant, Bxvi, ff. 
^36	 Ibid., 418. 
^37	 Kant, A69/B94.  I am thinking here of Kant’s assertion, ‘All bodies are divisible.’  This assertion involves two concepts, which are related to each other and to the object of judgment, which in this case is the set of all things thought under the description contained in the concept of a body.
^38	 Ian Hacking.  Representing and Intervening:  Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Science.  Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 1983, 97-98.  It is worth noting in passing that this makes Kant a scientific realist of a sort.
^39	 Ibid., 97-98. 
^40	 Ibid., 98 
^41	 Allen Wood, Kant.  Oxford:  Blackwell Publishing, 2005, 53. 
^42	 Ibid., 53.  See Kant, A57-59/B82-83. 
^43	 Ibid., 62. 
^44	 Ibid., 62.
^45	 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, xi. 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